By: Matthew Oldham
Source: AFP
On March 20, 2003, nearly 250,000 American troops entered into the vast unknown. U.S. Special Forces, along with troops from 40 other governments and almost 70,000 Kurdish soldiers propelled themselves into the heart of the Middle East—Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the War in Iraq had begun. The objective was to oust Saddam Hussein and rid his regime of their weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). After all, 13 of the 16 US intelligence agencies indicated that the Hussein regime had acquired yellow cake uranium and aluminum centrifuge tubes—two materials necessary for nuclear weapons and their missile systems. Even more compelling was that all of this information was verified by “Curveball,” –a former Iraqi nuclear physicist. The United States was coming in, full force.
Fast-forward two years. U.S. Forces are in disarray, Al-Qaeda factions are emerging, citizens and radicals are fighting back with improvised explosive devices that are rocking Baghdad every week. Soldiers are dying. The country is in turmoil. But there is no sign of a weapons program. No indication that WMDs were in Iraq, no trace of the yellow cake uranium or aluminum rocket tubes, the weapons facilities, or the transportation systems. Could the mighty and all encompassing United States have gotten their intelligence wrong? A 2005 commission report revealed that the U.S. had suffered one of the worst intelligence blunders in its history. Iraq did not have WMDs, no matter how badly the public and the Bush administration had wanted them to.
A radical shift in the hierarchy of the US intelligence community jump-started a new and improved way of collecting intelligence. A “C.E.O. of Intelligence”, a position responsible for inter-agency collaboration, was created—the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI was now appointed to oversee all 16 agencies in the US intelligence community, encouraging “all-source fusion,” and ending the compartmentalization that was notorious of US intelligence agency officials. U.S. intelligence agencies had the tendencies to be so overly focused on their own agendas, that they would miss the bigger picture. This is epitomized by several intelligence failures before the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, by both Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ranking officers, that are further explored. These “gorillas in the stovepipes,” as University of Georgia Regents Professor of International Affairs, Dr. Loch K. Johnson puts it, had put their own agenda above the good of the country, and for some reason established themselves as more important than American integrity. Perhaps the new director could stymie this well documented reoccurrence. Unfortunately, while the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established the DNI, it left out fundamental authority over budget, hiring, firing, and intelligence integration. These are problems that have reoccurred for every director since John Negroponte was appointed as the first DNI in 2005. Without the ability to control personnel and budget, the DNI has appeared inadequate in the international intelligence world. His inability to wield power has made the U.S. intelligence system appear weak across the world.
Many of these problems can be linked back to the budgetary control issues that stifled the ability of the DNI to make necessary policy changes. The IRTPA gives the DNI and the Secretary of Defense shared budget power, but this is case in actuality. Because of the strong backing the military has in the executive and legislative branches, the Secretary of Defense typically controls the majority of the intelligence budget. This often leads to military intelligence taking precedence over civilian intelligence, since the Secretary of Defense exerts most of the power. Inability to follow up on a report due to lack of resources, was another component of the intelligence failure leading up to 9/11. The “Phoenix Memo” was a July 2001 memo sent by a FBI agent who observed Middle Eastern pilots displaying strange behavior at several U.S. flight schools. This behavior included an interest to learn how to fly planes in midair, but not take off or land. The memo was received but a lack of resources did not allow arrests to be made.
As if the problems of controlling “King George’s Cavalry” were not enough, the inability to hire or fire is worse. Not only can the director make no hires, he cannot train people that are placed under his jurisdiction. Underdeveloped human resources lead to suffering intelligence. This can be linked back to the tragedy of 9/11. Due to a lack of language skills intelligence officers were unable to translate the Arabic phrase “tomorrow is zero hour” that alluded to the possibility of an attack. The DNI lacks ability to transfer personnel between departments or eliminate wasteful programs that are under his jurisdiction. He also must clear any transfers with the department and with the agency heads, who are at a lower rank than he is. These “bureaucratic politics” suffocate any influence the DNI may want to instill.
The inability of the CIA and the FBI to share information between themselves shows a lack of information integration in the intelligence system. In 2000, the CIA had information that two known associates of Osama bin Laden (and ultimately two of the hijackers) had entered the United States. They did not pass this information off to the FBI in a timely manner that could have resulted in the capture of the two men. The DNI was created largely to oversee all-source fusion or intelligence and information integration of all seventeen intelligence agencies. Since its creation, the DNI has failed in this area as well. When trying to step up analysis efforts, a class called “Analysis 101” was created for all 16 agencies to attend. This effort largely failed when independent agencies, like the CIA, refused to send personnel to the meeting, in blatant disrespect of the DNI’s new-found power. The DNI has also dropped the ball in promoting all-source fusion of intelligence, as not enough fusion centers, like the National Counterterrorism Center exists to collect all relevant intelligence on a particular topic. These centers could make the sharing of intelligence more harmonious and congruent, thereby ensuring upgraded national security.
The 2004 reformation of the United States intelligence system set out to upgrade security measures with the intention of preventing another 9/11. Has it made a difference? It does not appear so. A recent Department of Defense report states that U.S. intelligence does not possess the know-how to understand which states are upgrading their nuclear programs, the future appears quite bleak. By upgrading the status of the DNI, however, another attack can possibly be avoided. This will require a complete overhaul of his budgetary, personnel, and integration powers. By having the same amount of influence that the Secretary of State has, the DNI can preside over the U.S. Intelligence apparatus as the nation’s top spymaster.
